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LAW REFORM BY COURTS, LEGISLATURES,
AND COMMISSIONS FOLLOWING
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
J. ALEXANDER TANFORD
Empirical research demonstrates that jurors have difficulty un-
derstanding and following traditional instructions about the law. The
social science literature recommends several procedural reforms, in-
cluding giving important instructions at the start of the trial and pro-
viding jurors with written instructions. This article examines changes
in the law following the publication of this social science research,
comparing courts, legislatures and rule-making commissions. Analy-
sis reveals that although all three institutions are dominated by law-
yers, they have acted differently. Commissions have made substantial
changes in the law consistent with the recommendations of social
scientists, legislatures have made few changes, and courts have
changed case law in the opposite direction, suggesting support for a
theory of institutional context.
I. INTRODUCTION
Social scientists often assume that if their empirical research
reveals that a law is not operating as lawmakers intended, their
discoveries will help spur law reform. However, the anecdotal evi-
dence for empirical research as a motivator of legal change is
mixed at best. There have been some apparent successes. In the
wake of extensive research on eyewitness unreliability (e.g., Loftus
1979), many jurisdictions have changed the law to allow psycholo-
gists to testify about problems with eyewitness identification or to
require cautionary instructions (Loftus and Doyle 1987:280, 322).
There have also been some spectacular failures. The research dem-
onstrating that death-qualified juries are conviction prone has
been presented to many appellate courts but has not produced any
change in the law (Thompson 1989:191-94). The U.S. Supreme
The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Indiana University
School of Law, Bryant Garth, and the Center for the Study of Law and Society
at Indiana University. The data were presented at the 1990 Law and Society
Meetings, and valuable comments were received from Robin Stryker, Phoebe
Ellsworth, James Alfini, and others. John Flood provided sound advice on
quantitative methodology. I also received helpful comments from Shari Dia-
mond and three anonymous reviewers.
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Court disparaged the research and reasserted its approval of the
death-qualification process (Lockhart v. McCree 1986).
A number of theories have been propounded to explain condi-
tions under which social science will be used by legal policymak-
ers. Authors assert that social science is more likely to be used
when it is of high quality (Lempert 1988:176), uses dependent
measures lawyers can understand (Ruback and Innes 1988:683-84),
is accessible (Tremper 1987:272) or has penetrated the culture of
the educated elite (Kalven 1968), has been used by other law-
makers (Horowitz and Willging 1984:349-50), has been available
for at least five years (Hafemeister and Melton 1987:43-44), and
will legitimate decisions reached on pragmatic grounds (Lempert
1988:184; Stryker 1990b). Social science is less likely to be used
when it is heavily statistical (Thompson and Schumann 1987), con-
tradicts faith or common sense (Tanford 1990:153-54), fails to sup-
port the policy predilections of the lawmakers (Lempert
1988:184-85; Stryker 1990b), would lead to major political disrup-
tion (Thompson 1989:202-4; cf. Stryker 1989, 1990a), demonstrates
that something is ineffective without providing a better alternative
(Lempert 1988:182), or reflects values incompatible with the juris-
prudential principles of the particular area of law (Horowitz and
Willging 1984:345-46; Tanford 1990:156-66).
Some law and society literature suggests that the degree to
which social science research will affect legal policy depends in
part on the identity of the decisionmaker. Different legal actors
may be more or less receptive to social science (Lempert 1988).
Scattered studies indicate that empirical research has little or no
impact on appellate courts (Tanford 1989, 1990; cf. Davis 1987), but
may be more likely to influence legislatures and rule-making agen-
cies (Lempert 1988; Stryker 1989, 1990a). This institutional-context
theory has been difficult to investigate directly because of the frag-
mentation of policymaking responsibility within the legal system.
In most areas of law, policy will be formulated primarily by either
the courts, or the legislature, or a commission, but not by all three.
The law of jury instructions presents a rare opportunity to
compare the reactions of courts, legislatures, and commissions to a
single body of social science research. All three institutions share
responsibility for formulating legal policies about jury instructions,
and a substantial body of empirical research on the subject exists.
That research demonstrates that jurors have difficulty understand-
ing traditional jury instructions and suggests two procedural re-
forms: giving important instructions at the beginning as well as the
end of the trial, and providing jurors with written copies of their
instructions.' These findings have been widely disseminated to the
legal community.
1 The literature also recommends that instructions be rewritten in sim-
pler English, avoiding legal jargon and archaic language (e.g., Elwork, Sales,
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Qualitative analysis of legal texts, however, reveals that
courts, legislatures, and commissions have acted in quite different
ways since the empirical data have become available. Courts have
not only ignored the new data but actually have moved the law in
the direction opposite to the suggestions of social scientists. Legis-
latures generally have done nothing or moved slightly toward the
suggested reforms. Commissions have made the most substantial
changes, engaging in extensive reform of jury instruction proce-
dures along lines suggested by the research.
II. JURY INSTRUCTON PROCEDURES
The traditional courtroom procedure for informing juries
about the law is for the judge to read aloud a set of instructions at
the end of the trial (Tanford 1986:694-95). Giving substantive in-
structions at the beginning of the trial has been discouraged in
most jurisdictions (e.g., Missouri Supreme Court Committee on
Jury Instructions 1981:xxxviii). Supplying jurors with written cop-
ies of the instructions has been controversial. Some states have ex-
plicitly prohibited written instructions (e.g., Alabama Rules of
Civil Procedure 51), some have explicitly required them (e.g.,
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure § 36.18), and some have left the
matter to the discretion of the trial judge (e.g., California Penal
Code § 1093; Schwarzer 1981:756-57).
Between 1973 and 1982, a substantial body of empirical re-
search was published demonstrating that jurors have great diffi-
culty understanding instructions as they are traditionally given
(e.g., Charrow and Charrow 1979; Elwork, Sales, and Alfini 1977;
Strawn and Buchanan 1976). Among other findings, the literature
reported that subject-jurors often understood the law better if
they were given preliminary as well as final instructions, and/or if
they were given written copies of the instructions (Elwork, Sales,
and Alfini 1977:177; 1982:18-20, 155; Cruse and Browne 1987:130-32;
Forston 1975:612-16, 619-20; Severance and Loftus 1982:155 n.4).
Several of these authors concluded that comprehension of the law
could be improved if the laws restricting the use of preliminary
and written instructions were changed.
Much of this literature was made readily available to legal
policymakers. It was disseminated in law reviews (Charrow and
Charrow 1979; Forston 1975), judges' journals (Elwork, Alfini, and
Sales 1982; Forston 1973; Strawn and Buchanan 1976; Strawn et al.
1977; Taylor et al. 1980), and books marketed to the legal commu-
nity (Elwork, Sales, and Alfini 1982). The research supported the
views of a minority of judges (Avakian 1979:40; Weltner 1979:
20-21) and legal scholars who had urged these reforms on an intui-
tive basis (Hunter 1935:8-9; Prettyman 1960:1066). In addition,
and Alfini 1982). No single reform or combination of reforms is likely to solve
the entire problem.
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some legal precedent already existed for requiring written instruc-
tions (e.g., McElhaney v. State 1967; Texas Code of Criminal Proce-
dure § 36.18), or preliminary instructions (Indiana Trial Rule 51).
The empirical research thus was both easily accessible to the legal
community and suggested reforms compatible with the existing
trial system. These characteristics should have increased the likeli-
hood that social science research would have an impact on chang-
ing the law (see Hafemeister and Melton 1987:49-50; Ruback and
Innes 1988:684-87).
HI. CHANGES IN JURY INSTRUCTION PROCEDURE
Most of the relevant social science publications appeared be-
tween 1976 and 1982. I therefore looked for statements about the
law from before and after those dates in all fifty-two United States
jurisdictions.2 Because civil and criminal trials may be governed by
separate laws, preliminary and written instructions may be ad-
dressed separately, and the law may be stated in court opinions,
legislative statutes, and/or commission rules, a total of 624 possible
sources of jury instruction law exist.3 Using traditional legal re-
search methods, I found 139 before-and-after pairs of legal texts:
22 pairs of court decisions from 17 different jurisdictions, 53 pairs
of statutes from 25 jurisdictions, and 64 pairs of commission rules
from 29 jurisdictions (see Appendix). This study reports the find-
ings from all these pairs.
All legal texts require interpretation. Using conventional legal
analytical methods, I read each source and characterized its rule of
law on the use of preliminary and written instructions as one of
five: prohibited, discouraged, optional, encouraged, or required.
I characterized a procedure as prohibited if the legal text con-
tains clear prohibitive language or imposes a punitive sanction for
using the procedure. Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 51 is an ex-
ample of a direct prohibition: "Neither the pleadings nor the
'given' written instructions shall go into the jury room." The sanc-
tion model is illustrated by People v. Vincenty (1986:588): "The
trial judge [gave] preliminary instructions .... This procedure vio-
lated defendant's right to a fair trial and the error cannot be con-
sidered harmless."
I characterized a procedure as discouraged if a legal text states
disapproval of the procedure but stops short of outright prohibi-
tion, places restrictions on its use, or explicitly requires the use of
a different procedure. Taylor v. Monroe County (1981:701) contains
an example of disapproval language: "[T]he trial court [gave] a
copy of the instructions to the jury for use while deliberating.
2 The fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the federal courts.
3 I arrived at the total of 624 possible sources by multiplying 52 jurisdic-
tions X 2 (civil or criminal) X 2 (preliminary or written instructions) X 3
(court opinions, legislative acts, or commission rules).
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Although this practice is not recommended .... any error which
resulted was harmless." Arkansas Code § 16-64-114 illustrates the
restriction type: "It shall be the duty of the trial judge to deliver to
the jury ... a typewritten copy of the instructions [only] when
counsel for all parties so request." Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 30 is an example of a text that implicitly discourages prelimi-
nary instructions by explicitly requiring a different procedure:
"[The court shall instruct the jury after the arguments are com-
pleted."4
I considered a procedure optional if the legal text either ex-
plicitly takes no position on the use of the procedure, or leaves the
matter to the trial judge's discretion. State v. Parrish (1985:615) is
an example of a no-position law: "[P]retrial instructions to the jury
are neither condemned nor approved." Minnesota Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 26.03(18) is an example of the discretion version:
"[I]n the discretion of the trial court, a copy [of the instructions]
may be taken to the jury room when the jury retires for delibera-
tion."
I characterized a procedure as encouraged if the legal text rec-
ommends the procedure but leaves the final decision to the trial
judge's discretion, or establishes procedures that will have the nat-
ural effect of increasing its use. Copeland v. United States
(1945:770) illustrates the recommendation approach: "We think it
is frequently desirable that instructions [be] handed over to the
jury .... We see no good reason why the members of a jury should
always be required to... rely upon their [memories]. The question
should be determined by the judge in his discretion." California
Code of Civil Procedure § 612.5 is an example of a law that does
not explicitly recommend a procedure, but creates a situation
where use of the procedure will probably increase: "Upon the jury
retiring for deliberation, the court shall advise the jury of the
availability of a written copy of the jury instructions. [I]f the jury
requests ... a copy of the written instructions, the court shall sup-
ply the jury with a copy."
Finally, I considered a procedure required if the legal text
contains either a simple mandate without room for judicial discre-
tion, or imposes a sanction for not using the procedure. Michigan
Court Rule 2.516 illustrates the nondiscretionary mandate:
"[B]efore evidence is taken, the court shall give... preliminary in-
structions.., to enable the jury to understand the proceeding and
the evidence." McElhaney v. State (1967:645) illustrates the sanc-
tion model: "The failure to have the jury take the written charge
with them for deliberation constitute[s] reversible error."
To be selected for analysis, pairs of statements about proper
4 It is a general principle of statutory construction that expressio unius
est emclusio alterius: the specific mention of one thing implies the exclusion of
other alternatives (McCaffrey 1953:50-51).
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jury instruction procedures had to satisfy the following criteria: (1)
both came from the same institution--court, legislature, or com-
mission;5 (2) both concerned the same kind of trial-either civil or
criminal; (3) both concerned the same procedure--either prelimi-
nary or written instructions; (4) both contained a statement of law
about that procedure which could be characterized as prohibited,
discouraged, optional, encouraged, or required; and (5) one pre-
dated 1976 and the other came from 1982 or later.
Appellate Courts
In seventeen jurisdictions, I was able to find one or more pairs
of appellate cases that satisfied the basic selection criteria and that
involved no intervening preemptive action by the legislature or
any rule-making commission. These opinions are summarized in
Table 1. Analysis shows that 63.6 percent (14/22) of courts that had
an opportunity to change an existing procedural law did not do so,
regardless of the substance of that law. Among the eight courts
which did change their laws of jury instruction procedure, 100 per-
cent (8/8) changed in the negative direction, restricting rather
than expanding the use of the more effective jury instruction pro-
cedures recommended in the interdisciplinary literature. Negative
change occurred even in one case in which the appeals court made
indirect reference to the psycholinguistic research (State v.
McCloud 1984), and regardless of whether the trial judge had given
written instructions (Dunn v. Syring 1983) or refused to give writ-
ten instructions (Sanders v. State 1982).
Legislatures
In twenty-five jurisdictions, I was able to find one or more
pairs of statutes that satisfied the basic selection criteria. These
statutes are summarized in Table 2. Analysis shows that 88.7 per-
cent (47/53) of legislatures which had an opportunity to change an
existing procedural law did not do so, regardless of the substance
of the existing statute. However, when legislatures did amend jury
instruction statutes, 100 percent changed in the direction that the
literature suggests will result in more effective procedures. How-
ever, in telephone interviews, none of the legislators who spon-
5 Allocating responsibility for a change in law to a court, legislature or
commission is not always easy. For example, in Arkansas the legislature
passed 1971 Act No. 470, which authorized the supreme court to establish a
commission on rules of procedure. The court delegated this task to the attor-
ney general, who set up a semi-independent commission on which a deputy at-
torney general held much of the power. This commission recommends rule
changes to the supreme court which forwards them to the legislature, where
they become law by legislative inaction (see Arkansas Code Court Rules
1990:2). In all such cases of formal ambiguity, I have allocated responsibility to
whichever institution has the most significant active role in initiating change,
deciding what legal policy should be, and drafting proposed legal rules.
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Table 1. Judicial Opinions on Proper Jury Instruction Procedures
Preliminary Instructions Written Instructions
Before After Before After
1976 1982 Changea  1976 1982 Changea
Jurisdictions where law changed.
PA-crim Discouraged Prohibited -
NY-crim Optional Prohibited - Encouraged Discouraged -
AL-civ Optional Prohibited -
AL-crim Optional Discouraged -
DC-crim Encouraged Optional -
MN-crim Encouraged Optional -
OH-crim Required Encouraged -
Jurisdictions where law did not change:
IN-crim Discouraged Discouraged
IN-civ Discouraged Discouraged
AR-crim Optional Optional
GA-crim Optional Optional
HI-crim Optional Optional
ID-crim Optional Optional
KS-crim Optional Optional
MD-crim Optional Optional
MN-civ Optional Optional
NC-crim Optional Optional
US-crim Optional Optional Optional Optional
OK-crim Encouraged Encouraged
TN-crim Required Required
8A plus sign (+) indicates change consistent with the social science literature; a
minus sign (-) indicates change in the opposite direction.
Thirty-five other jurisdictions did not have relevant cases from before 1976 and
after 1982 or had an intervening change in legislation or rule of procedure.
sored law reform legislation reported being aware of the psychol-
inguistic research on jury instructions.6
Rule-Making Commission
Finally, I analyzed rules concerning preliminary and written
jury instructions promulgated by permanent rule-making commis-
sions on civil procedure, criminal procedure, or the courts. Such
commissions are established either by state supreme courts or leg-
islatures, have broad rule-making powers, and are relatively in-
dependent. I identified rules in twenty-nine jurisdictions that satis-
fied the basic selection criteria. These rules are summarized in
Table 3. Analysis reveals that 78.1 percent (50/64) of commissions
which had an opportunity to change an existing procedural law did
not do so, regardless of the substance of that rule. Among the four-
teen commissions which did change their rules of jury instruction
procedure, 100 percent (14/14) changed them in the direction rec-
6 Explanations vary. The Louisiana bill was recommended by the Louisi-
ana State Law Institute and "seemed like a good idea" (interview with Edward
C. Gaudin, state representative, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 15 March 1991). The
Georgia bill was introduced by a lawyer-legislator who thought it would be a
good idea based on his own experience as a trial lawyer (interview with Roy E.
Barnes, state senator, Marietta, Georgia, 14 March 1991).
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Table 2. Legislative Acts on Proper Jury Instruction Procedures
Preliminary Instructions Written Instructions
Before After Before After
1976 1982 Changea 1976 1982 Changea
Jurisdictions where law did not change:
MT-civ Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited
FL-crim Discouraged Discouraged Prohibited Prohibited
VA-civ Discouraged Discouraged Prohibited Prohibited
AR-both Discouraged Discouraged Discouraged Discouraged
GA-crim Discouraged Discou ed
IL-civ Discouraged Discouraged
LA-crim Discouraged Discouraged Discouraged Discouraged
NE-civ Discouraged Discouraged
NV-civ Discouraged Discouraged
NY-crm Discouraged Discouraged Discouraged Discouraged
NY-civ Discouraged Discouraged
NC-crim Discouraged Discouraged
OK-civ Discouraged Discouraged
wV-evl Discouraged Discouraged
WY-civ Discouraged Discouraged
ME-civ Optional Optional
MT-crim Optional Optional
KS-civ Optional Optional
KS-both Optional Optional
WI-civ Optional Optional
OK-crim Discouraged Discouraged Encouraged Encouraged
ID-crim Encouraged Encouraged
IA-crim Discouraged Discouraged Required Required
MO-crim Discouraged Discouraged Required Required
OH-crim Discouraged Discouraged Required Required
SD-civ Discouraged Discouraged Required Required
TX-crim Discouraged Discouraged Required Required
WY-crim Discouraged Discouraged Required Required
MS-crim Required Required
MS-civ Required Required
MO-dv Required Required
SD-crim Required Required
Jurisdictions where law change&
GA-civ Discouraged Optional +
LA-civ Discouraged Optional +
IN-crim Discouragedb Optional +
CA-crim Optional Optional Optional Encouraged +
CA-civ Optional Encouarged +
WI-crim Prohibited Optional + Required Required
'A plus sign (+) indicates change consistent with the social science literature; a
minus sign (-) indicates change in the opposite direction.
bPrior to 1976, no statute existed; case law discouraged written instructions.
ommended by the empirical research, expanding the use of more
effective jury instruction procedures.
Some commissioners apparently considered the psycholinguis-
tic research as one factor supporting law reform. The Penn-
sylvania Criminal Procedure Rules Committee (1984) cited
Elwork, Sales, and Alfini (1982) to support the use of preliminary
instructions. The chairman of the Florida Criminal Procedure
Rules Committee was personally aware of the social science litera-
ture, but reports that it played only an indirect role in the decision
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Table 3. Commission Rules on Proper Jury Instruction Procedures
Preliminary Instructions Written Instructions
Before After Before After
1976 1982 Change- 1976 1982 Changea
Jurisdictions where law did not change:
AL-civ Discouraged Discouraged
AR-civ Discouraged Discouraged
DC-crim Discouraged Discouraged
DC-civ Discouraged Discouraged
KY-civ Discouraged Discouraged
ME-civ Discouraged Discouraged
MA-civ Discouraged Discouraged
TN-civ Discouraged Discouraged
US-crin Discouraged Discouraged
US-civ Discouraged Discouraged
VT-crim Discouraged Discouraged
VA-crim Discouraged Discouraged
OH-crim Discouraged Discouraged
OH-eiv Discouraged Discouraged
DE-crim Optional Optional
DE-civ Optional Optional
NJ-both
MN-crim Optional Optional
IN-civ Required Required
CO-crim Discouraged Discouraged
CO-civ Discouraged Discouraged
NV-dv Discouraged Discouraged
ND-crim Discouraged Discouraged
ND-civ Discouraged Discouraged
OR-civ Discouraged Discouraged
TN-crim Discouraged Discouraged
UT-civ Discouraged Discouraged
WA-crim Discouraged Discouraged
WA-civ Discouraged Discouraged
ID-civ Optional Optional
WY-civ
Jurisdictions where one law changed:
AZ-civ Discouraged Optional
PA-crim Discouraged Optional
WV-civ Discouraged Discouraged
WV-crim
MN-civ Optional Optional
FL-crim
FL-civ Discouraged Discouraged
AR-crim
Jurisdictions where two laws changed-
MD-both Discouraged Optional
MI-both Optional Required
VT-civ Discouraged Optional
Prohibited Prohibited
Optional Optional
Discouraged Discouraged
Optional
Optional
Prohibited
Required
Required
Required
Required
Required
Required
Required
Required
Required
Required
Required
Required
Optional
Optional
Prohibited
Required
Required
Required
Required
Required
Required
Required
Required
Required
Required
Required
Required
Prohibited Optional
Prohibited Optional
Discouraged Optional
Discouraged Optional
Discouraged Encouraged
Discouraged Encouraged
Optional Encouraged
Discouraged Optional
Discouraged Required
'A plus sign (+) indicates change consistent with the social science literature; a
minus sign (-) indicates change in the opposite direction.
to change the rule concerning written instructions. The main rea-
sons for change were the personal experiences of the judges on the
commission.7 Vermont's rule was changed in part because of the
psychology and in part because other states used written instruc-
7 Interview with Gerald T. Bennett, chairman, Florida Criminal Proce-
dure Rules Committee, Gainesville, Florida, 2 May 1991.
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tions.8 Although the official commentary to the new Vermont
Rule 51 cites only legal literature to support the change (Nieland
1979:24-30, 32-34), Nieland discusses the psycholinguistic literature
(Elwork, Sales, and Alfini 1977; Forston 1975; Strawn and
Buchanan 1976). Other commissioners were not aware of the social
science literature and recommended changes based on experience
and the Manual for Complex Litigation (Federal Judicial Center
Board of Editors 1977). 9
IV. DISCUSSION
First, a caveat: The social science research on improving jury
instruction procedures is not the only factor that might have con-
tributed to changes in the law since 1976. For example, the change
in U.S. political climate between the Carter and Reagan presi-
dencies might be expected to have influenced legal outcomes, espe-
cially in criminal cases (see Rowland, Songer, and Carp 1988).
Also, ordinary legal evolution is always at work. The law con-
stantly changes, regardless of the existence of relevant empirical
research. For example, the Vermont Advisory Committee on the
Rules of Civil Procedure decided to require written instructions
based partly on the literature and partly on the fact that many
other states already encouraged or required them.10 Therefore,
caution must be exercised in making cause-and-effect generaliza-
tions about the impact of social science research on law reform.
In the case of jury instruction procedures, however, I would
expect these other factors to operate similarly on courts, legisla-
tures, and commissions. All three institutions are subject to the
same kinds of pressures brought about by shifts in political cli-
mate. All three bodies are dominated by lawyers. Both appellate
courts and rule-making commissions are made up entirely of law-
yers." Lawyers constitute the largest occupational category of
state legislators (Bazar 1987:2) and dominate state legislatures
(Abel 1988:227; Blair 1967:123-25), especially the judiciary commit-
s Interview with Kinvin Wroth, reporter, Vermont Advisory Committee
on Rules of Civil Procedure, Portland, Maine, 13 March 1991.
9 Interview with David Herr, reporter, Minnesota Advisory Committee
on Rules of Civil Procedure, St. Paul, Minnesota, 14 March 1991. See
Niemeyer and Richards 1984:303. West Virginia's rule of civil procedure was
changed at the suggestion of a trial court judge without knowledge of the em-
pirical research (interview with Ancil Ramey, clerk of Supreme Court,
Charleston, West Virginia, 13 March 1991). The Maryland Standing Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure debated and changed the rules of jury in-
structions without any mention of the literature (Minutes, October 15/16,
1982:40-43).
10 Interview with Wroth, Vermont (cited in note 8).
11 My conclusion that judges are lawyers is based on experience and com-
mon sense. My conclusion that commissioners are lawyers is based on the fact
that many states include a list of commission members with their published
rules of procedure, almost all of whom are identified by title either as "Hon."
or "Esq." (e.g., Pennsylvania Rules of Court 1990:xxi-xxii).
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tees through which bills concerning court procedure would proba-
bly pass.12
Evidence suggests that some legal policymakers know specifi-
cally about the social science research on jury instruction proce-
dures. The Pennsylvania Criminal Procedural Rules Commission
(1984) cited Elwork, Sales, and Alfini (1982). Florida's Committee
on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases included David
Strawn, who participated in some of the jury-instruction research
(e.g., Strawn et al. 1977; Strawn and Buchanan 1976). The Alaska
Supreme Court commissioned law professors Harvey Perlman and
Stephen Saltzburg to revise the state's jury instructions, and they
explicitly tried to use the suggestions of social scientists (Perlman
1986:520-23). Three published opinions on related issues cite the
literature, 13 and one appellate court decision on the use of written
instructions quotes a law review passage referring to "psychol-
inguistic research" on juror comprehension of instructions (State v.
McCloud 1984, quoting Schwarzer 1981). Some members of rule
commissions indicated they were aware generally of the social sci-
ence research.14
Other evidence suggests that the social science research may
have contributed indirectly to changes in the law of jury instruc-
tion procedures, even when lawmakers were unaware of it.
Although the legal literature had been suggesting changing the
law to encourage the use of preliminary instructions for at least
forty years (Hunter 1935:8-9; Prettyman 1960:1066), only one state
had done so prior to 1976 (Indiana Trial Rule 51). However, seven
states changed the law to permit preliminary instructions follow-
ing the publication of the social science research. Also, some
lawmakers were apparently influenced by intermediate legal pub-
lications (e.g., Nieland 1979) which made recommendations based
in part on the psycholinguistic research. I5 With the caveat about
unwarranted cause-and-effect generalizations in mind, several ob-
servations seem warranted:
1. The strongest factor influencing whether the law changes
seems to be legal inerta. Laws in place tend to stay in place: 88.7
12 For example, in 1985, 61 legislators chaired judiciary committees in the
states listed in Table 2 (Council of State Governments 1985). Of those for
whom occupational and educational data were available, 46/50 (92 percent)
were lawyers (Who's Who in American Politics 1989-90). Eulau and Sprague
(1964:115-17) assert that lawyers dominate state legislatures regardless of their
actual numbers. Other legislators come to them for advice on technical aspects
of bills. They are respected by other legislators and gain informal power. They
also have disproportionate formal power. Lawyers occupy more committee
chairs and are disproportionately represented on important committees.
13 Morgan v. LaLumiere (1986) cites Elwork, Alfini, and Sales 1982;
United States v. Alaton (1976) cites Strawn and Buchanan 1976; and People v.
Gonzalez (1980) cites almost all the literature.
14 Interviews with Bennett, Florida (cited in note 7), Herr, Minnesota
(cited in note 9), and Wroth, Vermont (cited in note 8).
15 Interview with Herr, Minnesota (cited in note 9).
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percent of statutes, 78.1 percent of rules, and 63.6 percent of appel-
late case precedents have gone unchanged since the early 1970s.16
2. The social science research has had no apparent impact on
appellate courts. To the extent that courts have changed the law of
jury instructions at all, they have moved in the direction contrain-
dicated by the empirical data. Appellate courts are now requiring
less effective instruction procedures, despite research demonstrat-
ing how to improve those procedures. Even when courts have been
aware of the literature, they have not changed the law in the di-
rection it suggests (State v. McCloud 1984). This is consistent with
a growing body of research showing that courts are ignorant of so-
cial science, may be hostile to using it as a basis for legal policy,
and prefer to,.base laws on expediency, precedent, and intuition
(Haney 1980:159-60; Saks and Baron 1980:3-16, 44, 119, 154;
Tanford 1990; cf. Lempert 1988:187-91).
3. The research appears to have had some effect on legisla-
tures and commissions. To the limited extent that these institu-
tions have changed the law, they have moved it in the direction
suggested by the empirical research.
4. Although the differences are not great, the amount of
change initiated by commissions appears by four measures to be
greater than legislative changes. First, commissions reformed the
law twice as often as legislatures: 21.9 percent of rules changed,
but only 11.3 percent of statutes were amended.17 Second, commis-
sions in three states changed both the rules concerning prelimi-
nary instructions and written instructions, but no legislature
changed both. Third, two commissions went so far as to require
the use of the procedural reform, but no legislature went beyond
encouraging its use. Fourth, in two states (Florida and West Vir-
ginia) that have overlapping rules and statutes, commissions
changed the rules but legislatures did not change the statutes.' 8
5. The social science literature appears to have played a
greater role in commission decisions than in legislative acts.
Among the legislators I interviewed who had sponsored bills to
change jury instruction practices, none was aware of the social sci-
16 There is some indication that court-made law changed more frequently
than legislative law. Different rates of change may be due to the relative diffi-
culty of ascertaining prior law. It is harder to find prior case law than to look
up a statute, so courts have a greater opportunity to change the law by mistake
or ignorance.
17 In Louisiana, the bill to amend jury instruction procedures actually
originated in and was recommended by a state agency.
18 In Florida (one of the states in which the original research was con-
ducted), two different commissions changed both the civil and criminal rules
of procedure to permit or encourage written instructions (Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.470; Florida Criminal Procedure Rule 3.390); the legislature did
not change the statute requiring that instructions be oral (Florida Statutes
§ 918.10). In West Virginia, a commission changed the civil rule to make writ-
ten instructions optional (West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 51), while the
statute went unchanged (West Virginia Code § 56-6-20).
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ence literature. For example, the sponsor of the Georgia amend-
ment wrote and introduced the bill because of his own experience
as a lawyer. One of his cases had to be tried three times because
jurors were confused about their instructions' 9 The sponsor of the
Louisiana bill introduced it because it was recommended by the
Louisiana State Law Institute.2 0 In contrast, some commissioners
said they were aware of the literature, and that it either had a sig-
nificant effect on the commission's decisions 2 ' or provided back-
ground support for their intuition. 22
V. CONCLUSIONS
Courts, legislatures, and commissions all share responsibility
for making legal policy concerning proper jury instruction proce-
dures. All have had opportunities to review and change their laws
in light of social science research showing that traditional proce-
dures are ineffective. Yet these three institutions have acted differ-
ently. Commissions have enacted the most changes consistent with
the social science research. Legislatures have changed only a little.
Court changes have been entirely in the opposite direction, appar-
ently unaffected by empirical data.
The extreme difference between courts and commissions is
particularly surprising. Both are staffed entirely by lawyers. Many
members of rule-making commissions are the very judges who sit
on appellate courts. The explanation for the different ways they
have changed the law may be that lawyers conceive of the roles
differently: judges are supposed to value precedent and follow ex-
isting law, commissioners to be innovative.
Alternatively, differences in law reform may be due to differ-
ences in the way lawmakers gather the information on which they
base their policy decisions. In the courts, the parties gather infor-
mation and present only that part of it that favors their positions.
The judge therefore may assume that information (including any
social science data) coming from a biased party is unreliable. In the
legislature, constituents present information, and legislators act
based on public perception of fact rather than fact itself.23 Social
science at odds with "common knowledge" is likely to be ignored.
In commissions, however, the commissioners themselves are re-
sponsible for gathering information and gaining personal exper-
tise. They are expected to be active information gatherers, and
19 Interview with Barnes, Georgia (cited in note 6).
20 Interview with Gaudin, Louisiana (cited in note 6).
21 Interview with Wroth, Vermont (cited in note 8).
22 Interviews with Bennett, Florida (cited in note 7), and Herr, Minnesota
(cited in note 9).
23 For example, if the public tends to believe that executing murderers
will deter crime (an empirical assertion), the legislature is likely to base its
laws on that perception and to ignore any research showing that deterrence
does not work or that executions have a brutalizing effect.
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thus the only legal actors likely to read the literature looking for
new information to incorporate into law reform. A full explana-
tion must await future research.
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